Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning
研究了激励变化时组织内的学习过程，利用秘鲁蛋厂的员工数据发现，薪酬变动会触发工人相互学习生产函数形状，但调整过程对企业有成本。
This paper studies learning within organizations when incentives change. We use a simple principal-agent model to show how, in the presence of imperfect information over the shape of the production function, worker's effort choice changes over time as information is disclosed and processed. We also show that changes in workers compensation can trigger such learning process. We test this hypothesis using personnel records from a Peruvian egg production plant. Exploiting a sudden change in the compensation schedule, we find that workers learn from each other over the shape of the production function. This adjustment process is costly for the firm.