Repeated Interaction and Rating Inflation: A Model of Double Reputation
研究了信用评级机构在投资者和发行人之间的双重声誉激励，发现发行人数量少的市场（如结构化资产市场）中，评级机构可能策略性膨胀评级以建立双重声誉，解释了金融危机中MBS和CDO评级膨胀的原因。
Credit rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among investors but also have an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency among issuers. We show that in markets with few issuers, such as markets for structured assets, these incentives may lead rating agencies to inflate ratings as a strategic tool to form a “double reputation.” The model extends the existing literature on “cheap-talk” reputation to the case of two audiences. Our results can explain why rating inflation occurred specifically in markets for MBSs and CDOs during the recent financial crisis. Policy implications are discussed.