Sharing the Burden: Monetary and Fiscal Responses to a World Liquidity Trap
分析了全球流动性陷阱下的最优政策应对，发现需求下降导致贸易条件恶化，零利率下无法对冲，伙伴国可能需加息，且最优应对需要货币与财政政策互动。
This paper analyzes optimal policy responses to a global liquidity trap. The key feature of this environment is that relative prices respond perversely. A fall in demand in one country causes an appreciation of its terms of trade, exacerbating the initial shock. At the zero bound, this country cannot counter this shock. Then it may be optimal for the partner country to raise interest rates. The partner may set a positive policy interest rate, even though its “natural interest rate” is below zero. An optimal policy response requires a mutual interaction between monetary and fiscal policy.