Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence
通过实验检验Hart和Moore提出的合同作为参照点的理论，发现灵活合同虽在标准假设下更优，但会导致事后绩效显著降低，而刚性合同则较少引发此类问题。
Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts—which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions—cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract.