The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
研究了存在摩擦的交易网络中竞争均衡的若干结构性质，包括格定理、乡村医院定理、侧最优均衡存在性以及群体激励相容性，这些结果也适用于组合需求交换经济和有转移的双边匹配市场。
Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side‐optimal equilibria, and a group‐incentive‐compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions. While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two‐sided matching markets with transfers.