Do Director Networks Matter for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Audit Committee Connectedness and Restatements
研究审计委员会通过董事网络形成的关联性对财务报告质量的影响，发现关联性强的审计委员会所在公司更少出现年报错报，且能缓解董事会连锁关系对财务报告质量的负面影响。
This study examines the effect of audit committee connectedness through director networks on financial reporting quality, specifically the misstatement of annual financial statements. Using network analysis, we examine multiple dimensions of connectedness and find that after controlling for operating performance and corporate governance characteristics, firms with well-connected audit committees are less likely to misstate annual financial statements. In addition, our study demonstrates that audit committee connectedness through director networks moderates the negative effect of board interlocks to misstating firms on financial reporting quality. We conduct several tests to address identification concerns and find similar results. Our findings suggest that firms with better-connected audit committees are less likely to adopt reporting practices that reduce financial reporting quality. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.