The Role of Lending Banks in Forced CEO Turnovers
研究发现，当企业业绩低于行业平均水平一个标准差时，银行贷款余额平均会使CEO被强制更替的概率提高22%至47%；若同时违反贷款契约，概率则大幅提高68%至92%，表明银行在治理业绩不佳的企业中发挥关键作用。
This article investigates the governance role of banks exercised through the replacement of underperforming CEOs in borrowing firms. An average level of bank loans outstanding implies a 22% to 47% increase in the forced turnover probability of a borrowing firm’s CEO if a firm’s industry adjusted performance is one standard deviation below average. This increase is much larger, 68% to 92%, when an underperforming firm violates its loan covenants. Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that banks play a key role in the governance of underperforming firms, especially when covenants are violated.