Bank Interventions and Trade Credit: Evidence from Debt Covenant Violations
利用债务契约违约场景，通过断点回归设计发现银行干预导致借款企业商业信用大幅下降，且依赖供应商会缓解、银行控制权动机加剧这一效应，进而影响贷款合同设计。
This study examines the consequences of conflicts between creditors. Using the setting of debt covenant violations, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of banks’ interventions on their borrowers’ trade credit. The results show that trade credit experiences a substantial decline when banks intervene in the borrowing firm following covenant violations. The decline is mitigated by the presence of dependent suppliers and exacerbated by banks’ incentives to exercise control rights. Such externalities are reflected in the loan-contract design. Borrowing firms sign less restrictive loan contracts when they rely more on trade credit or trade creditors.