Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities
提出联盟形成的外部效应符号（正或负）是分析经济联盟的有用原则，并比较了三种联盟形成规则下的稳定联盟结构，适用于研究联盟形成博弈的经济学者。
This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates eithernegativeexternalities orpositiveexternalities for nonmembers. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions. Examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions. I characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation: the Open Membership game of Yi and Shin (1995), the Coalition Unanimity game of Bloch (1996), and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements of Ray and Vohra (1994).Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C71.