Short-Selling Bans and Bank Stability
研究发现，监管机构为稳定金融机构而实施的卖空禁令，反而导致被禁股票金融机构的违约概率和波动性增加，尤其对更脆弱的机构影响更大。
Abstract In both the subprime crisis and the eurozone crisis, regulators imposed bans on short sales mainly aimed at preventing stock price turbulence from destabilizing financial institutions. Contrary to the regulators’ intentions, financial institutions whose stocks were banned experienced greater increases in the probability of default and volatility than unbanned ones. Increases were larger for more vulnerable financial institutions. To take into account the endogeneity of short sales bans, we match banned financial institutions with unbanned ones with similar sizes and levels of riskiness and instrument the 2011 ban decisions with regulators’ propensity to impose a ban in the 2008 crisis. Received July 8, 2020; editorial decision September 8, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.