Choosing (and Reneging on) Exchange Rate Regimes
利用各国宣布与实际执行的汇率安排数据，分析哪些国家言行不一，发现制度质量差的国家难以维持固定汇率并常放弃，而制度好的国家则常“害怕浮动”，实际干预多于宣布。
We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it often. In contrast, many countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, that is, they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability.