The Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments
研究员工异质性如何影响市场锦标赛中的努力激励，发现异质性员工能提高晋升决策对能力评估和工资的敏感度，从而增强努力激励，雇主最优选择是雇佣异质性员工。
We investigate the effect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to exert effort in a market-based tournament. External employers use promotion decisions to estimate employees' abilities and adjust their wage offers accordingly. Employees exert effort to increase the probability of being promoted and thus to increase their ability assessment and wage offer. We demonstrate that ability assessments and wage offers are more sensitive to promotion decisions in the case of heterogeneous employees. Thus, employees have a higher incentive to affect the tournament outcome, and employers find it optimal to hire heterogeneous employees.