Bayesian Juries and The Limits to Deterrence
研究了理性贝叶斯陪审团模型，发现即使惩罚无限大，由于证据不完美和定罪困难，犯罪率存在一个无法通过加重刑罚降低的下限，但提高证据质量或起诉门槛可降低该下限。
We consider a model of crime with rational Bayesian Jurors. We find that if jurors are not perfectly informed, even when there is no limit to the size of the punishment that can be imposed, it is not possible to deter all crime. There is a finite lower bound on the crime rate which results from the difficulties in achieving a conviction with imperfect evidence and very low crime rates. Crime can not be reduced below this rate by increasing the penalty, but the lower bound can be decreased by improving the quality of evidence presented to jurors, or by increasing the threshold of evidence necessary for prosecution. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.