Balance Sheet Conservatism and Debt Contracting
研究了借款人资产负债表保守主义（资产价值稳健性）在债务契约设计中的作用，发现其能降低借贷成本，尤其对信用质量较低的企业效果更强，并减少对限制性契约条款的需求。
Abstract We study the role of borrowers’ balance sheet conservatism (i.e., conservatism in asset values) in debt contract design. We find that borrowing costs are decreasing in the degree of balance sheet conservatism, and this effect is stronger for firms with lower credit quality. This is consistent with balance sheet conservatism reducing lenders’ uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, thus facilitating the ex ante screening of borrowers. We predict that better ex ante screening also reduces the need for ex post monitoring, and find that balance sheet conservatism is associated with less restrictive covenant terms. Further, we find that asymmetric timeliness in earnings is associated with lower borrowing costs only when balance sheet conservatism is not high. This result suggests that lenders appear to recognize the constraining effect of high balance sheet conservatism on future conservatism in earnings.