An Experimental Analysis of Risk-Shifting Behavior
通过实验室实验，研究高管在简单情境和存在持续价值及声誉效应时的风险转移行为，发现持续价值与声誉效应结合可消除风险转移。
We study risk-shifting behavior in a laboratory experiment, a setup that overcomes methodological hurdles faced by empiricists in the past. The participants are high-level managers. We observe risk shifting in a simple setup, but less so in a setup with a continuation value. Reputation effects also reduce risk shifting. When combined, a continuation value and reputation effects eliminate risk shifting. Our findings shed light on environments in which risk shifting is unlikely to happen, and why earlier studies produced conflicting results. In particular, our findings show that managers’ concerns with their own reputations are an important factor that mitigates risk shifting.