VALUE PRESERVING WELFARE WEIGHTS FOR SOCIAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
提出一种内生、价值保持的福利权重，替代等权重功利主义，要求个人禀赋对社会福利的贡献与最终分配对其福利的贡献成比例，在无摩擦环境中与Negishi权重一致，但当商品社会价值超过市场价值时主张向所有者再分配。
Abstract We propose endogenous, value preserving (VP) welfare weights as an alternative to equal weights utilitarianism. VP weights require that the contribution of an agent's endowments to social welfare is proportional to the contribution of the final allocation to his welfare. Under three axioms, the per unit contribution of a good to welfare is shown to equal the gradient of the welfare function. VP weights coincide with Negishi weights in frictionless environments but prescribe redistribution toward a good's owner when the good's social value exceeds its market value. When ability is treated as an endowment, VP weights reward ability and effort.