Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities
分析企业自愿披露模型，研究披露监管的合意性，发现披露价值凸性导致政策不连续，纳什均衡常缺乏社会效率，最低精度要求或补贴有时能改善福利，但两种监管方法互不占优。
We analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and the desirability of disclosure regulation. In our model disclosure is costly, it has private and social value, and its precision is endogenous. We show that (i) a convexity in the value of disclosure can lead to a discontinuity in the disclosure policy; (ii) the Nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game is often socially inefficient; (iii) regulation that requires a minimal precision level sometimes but not always improves welfare; (iii) the same is true for subsidies that change the perceived cost of disclosures; and (iv) neither regulation method dominates the other.