Targeted information and limited attention
研究了消费者注意力有限如何影响竞争企业的定向决策，发现即使企业能完美定向，也可能因注意力限制而选择大众广告，并分析了其对定价、市场份额和营销数据价值的影响。
Abstract We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer‐side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools.