An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational-Expectations Hypothesis
探讨了基于主体心理预测活动（如预测他人预测）来论证理性预期假说的方法，重点分析经典Muth模型中的推理性学习稳定性，并讨论信念协调的条件及其对噪声的稳健性。
This paper examines justifications of the rational-expectations hypothesis that rely on the analysis of the agents' mental forecasting ("educing") activity (which involves "forecasting the forecasts" of others, etc.). The corresponding concept of eductive learning stability, based on the game-theoretical concept of rationalizability, is primarily used within the classical Muth model. Conditions for coordination of beliefs are interpreted and discussed; they are robust to the introduction of noise. More generally, eductive stability fits economic intuition on coordination: stability increases when the industry product differentiation increases and when decisions are sequential and observable. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.