More Cash, Less Innovation: The Effect of the American Jobs Creation Act on Patent Value
研究发现，美国就业创造法案下获得现金回流的跨国企业，其专利价值反而下降，且这种现象在竞争较弱行业、机构持股低或CEO过度自信的企业中更明显，表明现金意外流入可能促使管理者采取高风险创新策略，损害价值。
Abstract Firms can become less innovative following a sudden cash “inflow.” Specifically, multinational firms that were eligible to repatriate (and indeed repatriated) cash to the United States under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) generate less valuable patents than otherwise similar firms. They also explore more. This effect only exists among firms in less competitive industries, firms with lower institutional ownership (IO), and firms with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs); this effect is mainly driven by the reduction in the value of U.S.-originated patents. Our evidence suggests that, without appropriate governance, a cash windfall may lead managers to engage in riskier innovation strategy, which can destroy value.