How Subprime Borrowers and Mortgage Brokers Shared the Pie
构建了抵押贷款经纪人收费的均衡模型，利用非交叉分位数回归估计费用分布，识别借款人估值与信息水平，量化经纪人获得的剩余份额及其随借款人信息增加而下降的趋势。
We develop an equilibrium model for origination fees charged by mortgage brokers and show how the equilibrium fee distribution depends on borrowers' valuation for their loans and their information about fees. We use noncrossing quantile regressions and data from a large subprime lender to estimate conditional fee distributions. Given the fee distribution, we identify the distributions of borrower valuations and informedness. The level of informedness is higher for larger loans and in better educated neighborhoods. We quantify the fraction of the surplus from the mortgage that goes to the broker, and how it decreases as the borrower becomes more informed.