Subjective Performance Evaluations, Collusion, and Organizational Design
研究了何时将主观绩效评估委托给经理是最优的，发现委托虽能提高评估准确性，但可能引发合谋，企业需降低员工激励并给经理更高薪酬来防止合谋，即便如此委托仍可能最优。
Many scholars have emphasized the importance of subjective performance evaluations in employment relationships to provide employees with effort incentives. This article examines when delegating subjective appraisals to managers is optimal. Delegation facilitates more accurate performance evaluations but can also lead to collusion. To prevent collusive behavior, I show that firms need to reduce effort incentives for employees and leave managers with economic rents through higher compensations. Despite these costs of preventing collusion, I find that delegation can be optimal. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.