Director Networks and Credit Ratings
研究了董事的社会资本（即拥有庞大且有影响力的网络）对信用评级的影响，发现更大的董事会网络与更高的信用评级相关，尤其在衰退和金融不确定性时期更有益。
Abstract We explore the effect of director social capital, directors with large and influential networks, on credit ratings. Using a sample of 11,172 firm‐year observations from 1999 to 2011, we find that larger board networks are associated with higher credit ratings than both firm financial data and probabilities of default predict. Near‐investment grade firms improve their forward‐looking ratings when their board is more connected. Last, we find that larger director networks are more beneficial during recessions, and times of increased financial uncertainty. Our results are robust to controls for endogeneity. Tests confirm that causality runs from connected boards to credit ratings.