WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN
研究在不对称任务和不完善绩效衡量下，工资下限如何影响最优工作设计，发现高工资下限可能导致雇主解雇员工或排除任务，且不完善衡量对专业化和多任务的影响不同。
We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral‐hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under specialization. We further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents' reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design.