Earnings Restatements, Changes in CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance
研究盈余重述后企业是否调整CEO薪酬结构以减少期权薪酬，以及这种调整是否通过降低投资风险来改善企业绩效。基于1997-2001年289家重述企业数据，发现期权薪酬比例下降，伴随投资风险降低和经营绩效提升。
ABSTRACT: Prior research finds that earnings restatements are linked to CEOs’ excessive option-based compensation and equity holdings. In this paper, we investigate whether firms that experience earnings restatements recontract with their CEOs to reduce their option-based compensation and if so, whether this leads to improved firm performance. Based on 289 restatement firms over the period 1997–2001, we find that the proportion of CEOs’ compensation in the form of options declines significantly in the two years following the restatement. Furthermore, we document that this reduction is accompanied by a decrease in the riskiness of investments, as reflected in lower stock return volatility and subsequent improvements in operating performance. Our results suggest that a decrease in option-based compensation reduces CEOs’ incentives to take excessively risky investments, resulting in improved profitability. Overall, our findings provide insights into the design and efficacy of CEO compensation contracts.