The Role of Government in the Labor–Creditor Relationship: Evidence from the Chrysler Bankruptcy
以克莱斯勒破产为例，研究发现政府干预导致工会化程度高的企业债券回报降低、收益率上升，且对濒临破产企业影响更大，凸显政府在债权人与工人代理冲突中的关键作用。
Abstract We examine the role of government in the labor–creditor relationship using the case of the Chrysler bankruptcy. As a result of the government intervention, firms in more unionized industries experienced lower event-window abnormal bond returns, higher abnormal bond yields, and lower cumulative abnormal bond returns. The results are stronger for firms closer to distress. We also observe the effect in firms in which labor bargaining power is stronger and those with larger pension liabilities. Overall, the results underline the importance of government as a significant force in shaping the agency conflict between creditors and workers.