Contracts offered by bureaucrats
研究了官僚在固定预算下向其代理人提供的合同，发现预算与政策漂移的互动导致低强度激励，并讨论了更严格的问责如何通过增加预算使官僚受益。
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low‐powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low‐powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.