Colluding through suppliers
研究下游企业如何在供应链竞争中通过合谋投入品供应合同来更容易地在产出市场合谋，发现高于成本的批发价和负固定费用（进场费）有助于下游价格合谋，而禁止批发价信息交换会减少合谋空间。
This article investigates downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.