Regulating Access to International Large-Value Payment Systems
研究银行监管国别化背景下国际大额支付系统的准入监管，重点比较净额结算与实时全额结算两种方式，发现公共监管无法实现最优准入标准，而银行因有限责任偏好净额结算，但若银行掌握对手方信息，私人参与监管可向当局揭示信息。
This article studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems when banking supervision is national. We focus on the choice between net and real-time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the communication between the public authorities is endogenized. It is shown that the national authorities’ incentives are not perfectly aligned concerning the settlement method. Therefore public regulation fails to implement the first-best access criteria. Banks prefer net settlement too often due to limited liability. Still, if banks have superior information about their counterparties, private involvement in access regulation is desirable as it reveals information to the public authorities.