Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: a Case Study in Unintended Consequences
研究了欧盟2014年起对银行奖金设置上限的监管规定，发现该规定反而会增加冒险激励、提高固定薪酬、降低价值创造动力和银行业竞争力，并导致投资银行家素质下降，增加资本成本。
Abstract Beginning in 2014, the European Union (EU) will limit the amount of bankers' bonuses to the amount of fixed remuneration; the cap could be increased to 2:1 with the backing of a supermajority of shareholders. I demonstrate that the pending EU regulations restrictions will: (1) increase rather than decrease incentives for excessive risk taking; (2) result in significant increase in fixed remuneration; (3) reduce incentives to create value; (4) reduce the competitiveness of the EU banking sector; and (5) result in a general degradation in the quality of EU investment bankers, thereby decreasing access to capital and increasing the cost of capital .