Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem
研究了买方期权合同如何通过允许买方选择产品变体并决定是否接受交付，来解决敲竹杠问题，并证明该合同足以实现最优结果。
Buyer option" contracts, in which the buyer selects the product variant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery, are often used to solve hold-up problems.We present a simple game that focusses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposes inefficient actions in order to improve his bargaining position.We argue for one of several alternative ways to model this situation.We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the foundations of incomplete contracts and show that a buyer option contract is sufficient to induce first-best outcomes.