The Retention Effects of Unvested Equity: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting
利用FAS 123-R会计准则变更导致723家公司突然取消股票期权归属期这一准自然实验，发现CEO离职时保留的期权增加33%，自愿离职率从5%升至21%，且离职公司股价下跌并提高留任及新聘高管薪酬。
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show this by analyzing a unique regulatory change (FAS 123-R) that prompted 723 firms to suddenly eliminate stock option vesting periods. This allowed CEOs to keep 33% more options when departing the firm, and we find that voluntary CEO departure rates subsequently rose from 5% to 21%. Our identification strategy exploits FAS 123-R’s almost-random timing, which was staggered by firms’ fiscal year-ends. Firms that experienced departures suffered negative stock price reactions, and responded by increasing compensation for remaining and newly hired executives.