Executive Directors, Pay Disclosures, and Incentive Compensation in Large European Companies
基于1999-2004年158家欧洲最大公司的数据，研究发现高管担任董事和CEO兼任董事长会提高薪酬披露透明度和薪酬绩效敏感性，且这种关系在股东保护更强的国家更显著，支持最优契约理论而非寻租理论。
Using a proprietary database for the largest 158 European companies during 1999-2004, I find that transparency of executive pay disclosures and sensitivity of executive pay to performance increase with the proportion of top executives serving as company directors and with dual chief executive officer (CEO) and board chairs. These relations strengthen in countries with more protection for outside shareholders. The positive marginal effects of executive directors (i.e., insiders) on transparency of pay disclosures and sensitivity of pay to performance are not significant when (1) insiders already have the numerical majority on boards, (2) CEOs are board chairs, and (3) pay levels and company ownership of executives are relatively high. Overall, the evidence supports the optimal-contracting argument over the rent-seeking argument. Specifically, companies mitigate agency costs associated with the existence of company executives on boards through transparent pay disclosures and incentive compensation. However, such actions are limited to companies with strong country-level investor protection and significant representation of independent directors on company boards.