The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?
研究了卖空威胁是否迫使管理者减少盈余管理，利用33个国家2002-2009年的数据发现两者显著负相关，并通过工具变量和外生监管实验证实因果关系，表明卖空是一种外部治理机制。
We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.