Probability Weighting and Employee Stock Options
研究发现风险更高、特质波动更大的公司会向非高管员工授予更多股票期权，并用前景理论中的概率加权偏好解释了这一现象，表明公司可利用期权满足员工对“长线赌注”的需求。
Abstract This paper documents that riskier firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility grant more stock options to nonexecutive employees. Standard models in the literature cannot easily explain this pattern; a model in which a risk-neutral firm and an employee with prospect theory preferences bargain over the employee's pay package can. The key feature which makes stock options attractive is probability weighting. The model fits the data on option grants well when calibrated using standard parameters from the experimental literature. The results are the first evidence that risky firms can profitably use stock options to cater to an employee demand for long-shot bets.