Asymmetric Auctions with Resale
研究独立私人价值模型中，不对称竞拍者在一级价格拍卖和二级价格拍卖后通过垄断定价进行转售的均衡与收入比较，发现转售使一级价格拍卖的预期收入高于二级价格拍卖。
We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. We show (a) a first-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium; and (b) with resale, the expected revenue from a first-price auction exceeds that from a second-price auction. The inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a general revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded.