Empirical Evidence of Overbidding in M&A Contests
基于利润最大化竞标行为的必要条件，开发了一种不受内生性影响的直接实证检验，发现并购竞标中存在显著的过度出价现象，且与利益冲突和未能充分考虑赢家诅咒有关。
Surprisingly few papers have attempted to develop a direct empirical test for overbidding in merger and acquisition contests. We develop such a test grounded on a necessary condition for profit-maximizing bidding behavior. The test is not subject to endogeneity concerns. Our results strongly support the existence of overbidding. We provide evidence that overbidding is related to conflicts of interest, but also some indirect evidence that it arises from failing to fully account for the winner’s curse.