Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation
论证债权人友好型破产法导致过度清算，抑制企业创新；而债务人友好型破产法通过促进失败后继续经营，激励更多创新。利用专利数据和时间序列及跨国证据支持这一结论。
We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for this claim by employing patents as a proxy for innovation. Using time-series changes within a country and cross-country variation in creditor rights, we confirm that a creditor-friendly code leads to a lower absolute level of innovation by firms, as well as relatively lower innovation by firms in technologically innovative industries. When creditor rights are stronger, technologically innovative industries employ relatively less leverage and grow disproportionately slower.