The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation
研究了美国银行资本监管如何促使非银行机构（影子银行）在企业贷款市场中扩张，并发现这种转移在2008年危机中导致贷款展期减少和价格波动加剧。
Abstract We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation is associated with important adverse effects during the 2008 crisis: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility.