Analyst Coverage and Financing Decisions
研究发现分析师覆盖较少的公司更少发行股票、更依赖债务融资，且其股票发行更受市场时机影响，支持信息不对称和市场择时理论。
ABSTRACT We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Finally, debt ratios of less covered firms are more affected by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) “external finance‐weighted” average market‐to‐book ratio. These results are consistent with market timing behavior associated with information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance.