Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure
研究了日本子公司上市时，母公司出售更多股份或存在更大侵占可能性的子公司定价过高，导致少数股东在错误定价修正后表现不佳，而母公司常以折价回购并获正收益。
Standard theories of ownership assume insiders ultimately bear all agency costs and therefore act to minimize conflicts of interest. However, overvalued equity can offset these costs and induce listings associated with higher agency costs. We explore this possibility by examining a sample of public listings of Japanese subsidiaries. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.