Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements
分析搭售对研发激励的影响，指出搭售能帮助企业承诺更积极的研发投资，同时削弱竞争对手的研发动力，其盈利性和福利效应取决于研发竞争的性质。
This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on R&D incentives. It shows that tying is a means through which a firm can commit to more aggressive R&D investment in the tied goods market. Tying also has the strategic effect of reducing rivals' incentives to invest in R&D. The strategy of tying is a profitable one if the gains, via an increased share of dynamic rents in the tied goods market, exceed the losses that result from intensified price competition in the market. The welfare implications of tying, and consequently the appropriate antitrust policy, are shown to depend on the nature of R&D competition.