The Optimal Size of Hedge Funds: Conflict between Investors and Fund Managers
研究对冲基金的标准薪酬合同是否使经理与投资者利益一致，发现经理薪酬在基金资产增长时增加，即使存在规模不经济，导致经理最优规模远大于投资者最优规模。
ABSTRACT This study examines whether the standard compensation contract in the hedge fund industry aligns managers’ incentives with investors’ interests. I show empirically that managers’ compensation increases when fund assets grow, even when diseconomies of scale in fund performance exist. Thus, managers’ compensation is maximized at a much larger fund size than is optimal for fund performance. However, to avoid capital outflows, managers are also motivated to restrict fund growth to maintain style‐average performance. Similarly, fund management firms have incentives to collect more capital for all funds under management, including their flagship funds, even at the expense of fund performance.