Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
研究了在允许互补性和同伴效应的匹配与联盟形成环境中，偏好随自然状态变化时，核心稳定联盟结构存在的充要条件是偏好成对一致，并分析了该框架如何颠覆已知的比较静态结论。
We study matching and coalition formation environments allowing complementarities and peer effects. Agents have preferences over coalitions, and these preferences vary with an underlying, and commonly known, state of nature. Assuming that there is substantial variability of preferences across states of nature, we show that there exists a core stable coalition structure in every state if and only if agents' preferences are pairwise-aligned in every state. This implies that there is a stable coalition structure if agents' preferences are generated by Nash bargaining over coalitional outputs. We further show that all stability-inducing rules for sharing outputs can be represented by a profile of agents' bargaining functions and that agents match assortatively with respect to these bargaining functions. This framework allows us to show how complementarities and peer effects overturn well known comparative statics of many-to-one matching.