Does Reputation Limit Opportunistic Behavior in the VC Industry? Evidence from Litigation against VCs
通过手工收集的诉讼数据，研究发现声誉更好的VC（成立更久、管理更多资金、联合投资网络更大）被起诉的可能性更低，而被起诉的VC未来业务会下滑，声誉越高的VC损失越大。
ABSTRACT We examine the role of reputation in limiting opportunistic behavior by venture capitalists towards four types of counterparties: entrepreneurs, investors, other VCs, and buyers of VC‐backed startups. Using a hand‐collected database of lawsuits, we document that more reputable VCs (i.e., VCs that are older, have more deals and funds under management, and syndicate with larger networks of VCs) are less likely to be litigated. We also find that litigated VCs suffer declines in future business relative to matched peers. These declines are larger for more reputable VCs, and for VCs that are defendants to multiple lawsuits or sued by entrepreneurs.