The syndicate structure of securitized corporate loans
研究发现证券化贷款的主牵头行份额更低，但非CLO机构投资者份额更高，这种差异主要由信息不对称和信用风险解释，且证券化贷款与非证券化贷款的表现无显著差异。
Abstract Securitized loans have lower lead bank shares, but larger shares held by non‐CLO (collateralized loan obligation) institutional investors than nonsecuritized loans. The result can largely be explained by their degree of information asymmetry and credit risk. We find that lead banks increase their holdings after a nonsecuritized loan becomes securitized, but they do not reduce financial exposure to securitized facilities during the boom of the CLO market. Furthermore, we find that securitized loans do not perform differently from similar nonsecuritized loans. We conclude that differences in syndicate structure are likely shaped by participants’ investment preference rather than a manifestation of adverse selection.