On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships
研究贷款销售中的合同设计如何解决信息问题，发现被出售的贷款包含更多限制性条款，借款人通过获得更多私人债务和更持久的借贷关系来补偿额外成本。
This paper examines the secondary market for loan sales and, in particular, loan contract design as a mechanism to resolve informational issues in loan sales and associated costs and benefits. Using loan-level data, we find that sold loans contain additional covenants and more restrictive net worth covenants, particularly when agency and informational problems are more severe. Why do borrowers agree to incur the additional costs associated with loan sales? Our evidence suggests that these borrowers benefit through increased private debt availability. Further, loan sales go hand in hand with more durable lending relationships, suggesting that risk management aids continued relationship lending.