Is Enhanced Audit Quality Associated with Greater Real Earnings Management?
研究了当高质量审计师限制应计盈余管理时，企业是否转向成本更高的真实盈余管理，发现审计师行业专长和审计费用与真实盈余管理正相关，对审计师轮换有启示。
SYNOPSIS We examine whether firms resort to real earnings management when their ability to manage accruals is constrained by higher quality auditors. In settings involving strong upward earnings management incentives, i.e., for firms that meet or just beat earnings benchmarks and firms that issue seasoned equities, we find that city-level auditor industry expertise and audit fees are associated with higher levels of real earnings management. We find similar, albeit weaker, results for the Big N auditors. Our paper suggests an unintended consequence of higher quality auditors constraining accrual earnings management, namely, firms resorting to potentially even more costly real earnings management. We also find that longer auditor tenure is associated with greater real earnings management, which could suggest merits of mandating audit firm rotation. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.