Analysts’ Weighting of Private and Public Information
发现分析师在预测公司盈利时平均会过度依赖自己的私有信息，且这种过度加权在预测高于市场共识时更明显，在低于共识时则减轻甚至转为低配，说明激励因素比行为偏差影响更大。
Using both a linear regression method and a probability-based method, we find that on average, analysts place larger than efficient weights on (i.e., they overweight) their private information when they forecast corporate earnings. We also find that analysts overweight more when issuing forecasts more favorable than the consensus, and overweight less, and may even underweight, private information when issuing forecasts less favorable than the consensus. Further, the deviation from efficient weighting increases when the benefits from doing so are high or when the costs of doing so are low. These results suggest that analysts' incentives play a larger role in misweighting than their behavioral biases. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.