Bank Risk-taking, Securitization, Supervision, and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro-area and the U.S. Lending Standards
利用欧元区和美国银行贷款标准数据，发现低短期利率会放松家庭和企业贷款标准，证券化、资本监管薄弱和长期低利率会放大这一效应，而低长期利率无此影响。
Using a unique dataset of the Euro-area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards for household and corporate loans. This softening--especially for mortgages--is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital, and low monetary policy rates for an extended period. Conversely, low long-term interest rates do not soften lending standards. Finally, countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative Taylor rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterward. These results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.